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THE CASE FOR NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Delmar David Steinbock, Jr.
Legal systems have long grappled with the complexity of family
and marriage dissolution, attempting to reconcile the individual's desire
for divorce with society's desire to perpetuate marriages and thereby
strengthen the family unit. Different cultures have advanced different
methods for achieving this reconciliation. Consideration of these
methods is significant today because antiquated thinking continues to
govern much of the Anglo-American treatment of the problem.
The present analysis will treat the primary means of dissolution,
divorce-past, present, and future. The treatment will focus on the
fault-oriented aspects of divorce laws in California, Iowa, and Okla-
homa with a discussion of the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, promulgated by the American Bar Association Family Law Sec-
tion. The author's concluding recommendations will suggest reforms
keyed, in part, to the Uniform Act. It is hoped that this list of proposals
will prompt inert legislators everywhere to begin considering some form
of reformation of their respective divorce laws, and that these proposals
will represent a springboard toward that end.
A fault-oriented approach to divorce has existed since the Middle
Ages. The history of divorce is curious, not so much for the lessons
it teaches as for its continuing influence on twentieth century law. Pre-
cepts formulated during more unenlightened periods remain immov-
able. In early Rome marriage was a civil contract and quite freely
terminable at will, but family mores rendered divorce quite rare. As
these mores began to break down, divorce became more commonplace.
Often marriages lasted for days only. Rome had developed that
raucously free life style so often maligned in movies and sermons. The
fear of a return to such a life style permeates much of present day law
and literature.1
1. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of the Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM.
L. 179, 185 (1968).
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The reaction to this hedonistic pattern of life fostered the develop-
ment of the fault-oriented approach to divorce.2 Early Christians dis-
approvingly witnessed the sexual freedom of the time and sought a
change to -the other extreme. When the empire became Christian, and
as the Catholic Church became stronger, the concept of indissoluble
marriages surfaced and developed.3
During the Dark Ages, divorce based on marital fault became the
only divorce available. Under the reign of Charlemagne, the Ecclesi-
astical Courts were entrusted with the disposition of marital problems.
It was during this period that marriage was raised to the dignity of a
sacrament. A spouse could only dream of divorce during the days of
chivalry and honor. Marriage became a bond that no man could put
asunder.4
The Protestant Reformation signaled another shift in policy.
Marriage and divorce once again became a civil contract. This returned
family law to the courts of the state.
The current movement in the United States for more realistic
grounds is a development of the last forty years. The Soviet Union
adopted a modem approach to marital breakdown as long ago as 1917.0
A few states in America have taken dramatic steps toward
implementing the "no-fault" concept by revamping their traditional
divorce statutes. California7 and Iowa present the most progressive ex-
amples of the reformation to "no-fault" divorce." Provisions of their
divorce laws offer sensible and effective alternatives to present divorce
laws in other jurisdictions. 9
Oklahoma is a curious focal point because early in the divorce
reformation movement Oklahoma pioneered in expanding the tradi-
tional grounds for divorce to include incompatibility. Much as this had
seemed to signal an advance toward "no-fault" divorce, subsequent in-
terpretation" and legislative inertia have revealed that Oklahoma is
2. Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response
to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. AM. L. 261, 271 (1971).
3. Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries, 18 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 7 (1953).
4. Whaling, The No-Fault Concept, 47 N. DAlm LAw. 959, 960 (1972).
5. Id. at 962.
6. Gsovski, Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Law, 35 GEo. L.I. 209 (1947).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506-1 (West. Supp. 1969).
8. Id. § 4507.
9. Id. § 4509.
10. Wailer v. Waller, 439 P.2d 952 (Okla. 1968); Wegener v. Wegener, 365 P.2d
728 (Okla. 1961); Hughes v. Hughes, 363 P.2d 155 (Okla. 1961); Rakestraw v.
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really not much closer to "no-fault" divorce than she was in 1953 when
incompatibility was included in the grounds.
California took a giant step toward "no-fault" divorce in 1970 by
reforming its divorce laws.11 Prior to the change, in order to obtain
a divorce, the plaintiff needed to prove his spouse "guilty" of one of
the specific grounds for divorce." The fault concept was also an inte-
gral part of property divisions and alimony awards. 13 The same process
still applies in many jurisdictions.
Several objections to the fault system influenced the move for re-
form. The realization that only in exceptional cases would a single act
of fault or misconduct cause an irreparable breakdown of the marriage
was one objection.' 4  Another factor was the constant bitterness and
acrimony promoted by the traditional system. 15 Often the process
created an occasion for perjury. It tempted a party to lie to satisfy a
particular fault ground in order to use the fault-determination to win
a more favorable monetary award.16 The situation reached scandalous
proportions resulting in a distinct loss of prestige and public confidence
in the courts.17
The new California divorce law repeals the traditional grounds and
replaces them with two distinct bases for marital dissolution.' 8 In-
curable insanity is one of the two new grounds;' 9 the other is
"irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable break-
down of the marriage.120  Irreconcilable differences are defined as
those which constitute "substantial reasons for not continuing the
marriage and which make it appear that the marriage should be dis-
solved." Unfortunately, this definition is vague and uncertain. The
standard lends itself to subjective judicial interpretation, a situation that
Rakestraw, 345 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1959); Chappell v. Chappell, 298 P.2d 768 (Okla.
1956).
11. Comment, The End of Innocence: The Elimination of Fault in California Di-
vorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1306, 1324 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Innocence].
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 92 (West 1954).
13. Id. § 146. See also, Comment, California's Divorce Reform: Its Effect on
Community Property Awards, 1 PAC. L.J. 310 (1970).
14. Innocence, supra note 11, at 1310.
15. Id. See also, Philips, Mental Hygiene, Divorce and the Law, 3 J. FAM. L. 63
(1963).
16. Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. Rav. 32, 83
(1966). See also J. CALIF. Ass., 1969 Reg. Sess., 8058 (Aug. 8, 1969) [hereinafter
cited as Assembly Report].
17. Innocence, supra note 10, at 1312.
18. Id. at 1315.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506-2 (West Supp. 1969).
20. Id. § 4506-1.
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the framers were attempting to remedy.1
In the new proceeding, evidence of fault or misconduct will not
be permitted except when relevant in a child custody determination.
However, there is an exception that could effectively emasculate the
"no-fault" guidelines. The court may determine that evidence of mis-
conduct is "necessary to establish the existence of irreconcilable
differences. 22  This is an open invitation for the introduction of
instances of marital fault and misconduct, in direct contravention of 'the
avowed legislative purposes of the new act. Neither is it clear what
degree of marital fault will satisfy the requirement of irreconcilable dif-
ferences.
The property division provisions of the new law eliminate con-
sideration of fault. Community property is divided equally.' This
requirement removes the previously existing incentive to present fault
evidence in order to obtain a larger share of the property. Arguments
still remain as to where ,to draw the line on valuation of the property,
but -the acrimony engendered by the old finger-pointing is now dead.
Factors considered in the property division are (a) duration of the mar-
riage, (b) the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful em-
ployment, and (c) the economic condition of the parties. Alimony is
determined, thus, by a standard of fairness rather than fault or guilt.23
In the area of child custody, all evidence relative to the child's
best interests is considered, including parental fault or misconduct.21
This proceeding may easily be separated from the dissolution and
property portions of the hearing to insure -that the fault evidence does
not influence the other determinations. Also, a lawyer may be
appointed to guard the interests of the child if the court deems it neces-
sary. A later recommendation will indicate a more desirable plan for
providing lawyers for the children and for limiting the scope of admis-
sable fault evidence in the child custody proceeding.
California's law is not perfect. It is an example of the proper
direction to be followed and may serve as a model to suit -the needs
and desires of particular jurisdictions as they see fit. A major problem
with the California law is its failure to provide definitive standards for
21. Bodenheimer, supra note 1, at 183; see Innocence, supra note 11, at 1323; cf.
Assembly Report, supra note 15, at 8057.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4507; see, In re Walton's Marriage, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 479,
28 Cal. App. 3d 108 (1972).
23. Innocence, supra note 10 at 1316; see, CAL. Civ. CODE § 4509 (West Supp.
1969).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West Supp. 1969).
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courts to follow. The present vague definition of "dissolution" permits
too much judicial adjustment, too much opportunity for the judge to
impose standards on the parties before him. In the hands of an artist,
the law becomes a judicial work of art. In the hands of a hack, a work
of ugliness.2 5
In 1970, the Iowa state legislature also made a pronounced move
toward "no-fault" divorce. The traditional grounds for divorce were
replaced with a standard based upon the actual breakdown of the mari-
tal relationship. 20 Now dissolution of the broken marriage occurs with-
out casting blame on either spouse for having caused the factual ending
of the marriage. Under the Iowa law, the "irretrievable breakdown
of the marital relationship" 27 is the sole basis for ending the marriage.
A marriage may be terminated "when the court is satisfied from the
evidence presented that there has been a breakdown of the marriage
relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have
been destroyed and there is no reasonable likelihood that the marriage
can be preserved. ' 28  Unfortunately, the Iowa law provides insufficient
guidelines as to what is a satisfactory presentation of evidence to please
the court. 9  Once again, as in California, the personal views of the
judge may be easily imposed on the parties.
The Iowa statute directs that the division of assets of the parties,
support of either party, and support of children be based on "competent
and relevant evidence." The Iowa Supreme Court answered some
questions involving fault and the financial settlement in In re Marriage
of Williams holding that the evidence of fault for the marriage break-
down is not a factor in the determination of financial rights and obliga-
tions.30
A commonly voiced fear of "no-fault" divorce is that it will cause
a marked increase in the already soaring divorce rate. Two years fol-
lowing passage of the Iowa Act an empirical study was conducted
among judges and lawyers in Iowa. This study revealed that, by and
large, the reaction to the new law was favorable.31 There has been
an increase in the actual number of divorces by approximately 55032
25. D. CANTOR, ESCAPE FROM MARRIAGE 108 (1971).
26. Sass, The Iowa No-Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law in Action, 18 S. DAK.
L. REv. 628 (1973).
27. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598 (1973).
28. Id. § 598.17 (West Supp. 1972).
29. Sass, supra note 26. at 632.
30. In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 1973).
31. Sass, supra note 26, at 648.
32. Id. at 636.
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per year in 1971 and 1972. 3 A good portion of these increases may
have been attributable to the growth of legal aid services-in 1970
legal aid offices were established in the seven largest cities in Iowa 4-
and the consequent increase in -the availability of divorce to those in
lower income brackets.
In any event, there certainly has not occurred the deluge of liti-
gants that had been forecast by critics. Divorce has become easy in
Iowa, easy to the extent that unrealistic legal obstacles have been re-
moved in order to provide a just and quiet dissolution to an "empty
legal bond." This is as it should be throughout the law.
The divorce laws of Oklahoma are hardly satisfactory, despite
legislative attempts at revision. The laws represent a historical mixture
of religion, sentiment, and accident. 35  Oklahoma statutes presently
provide twelve specific grounds for divorce.3" In 1953 the ground of
incompatibility was added. In terms of what had been the attitude
toward divorce, this was a revolution. "No-fault" divorce seemed to
be on the horizon. This vision has not been realized, however.
In adding incompatibility as a ground, the legislature failed to de-
fine it. Incompatibility is predicated on the theory that if two spouses
can no longer cohabit as husband and wife, they should be divorced
upon the application of either party. For a time in Oklahoma it was
held that both partners needed to be incompatible with each other in
order for the ground to exist.37 In Rakestraw v. Rakestraiv the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that only one partner need feel incom-
patible; that is, if one party could not live harmoniously with the other,
then the relationship was incompatible, notwithstanding 'that the other
33. Iowa STATE DEP'T HEALTH, ANNUAL REPORTS op ViTAL STATISTICS show the
following:
Year Divorces
1967 6018
1968 6464
1969 6923
1970 7124
1971 7658*
1972 8238*
* Excludes estimated annulments which were also includes in the dissolution
figu-es.
34. Cedar Rapids, Council Bluffs, Davenport, Des Moines, Dubuque, Iowa City,
and Muscatine.
35. Sonberg, Grounds For Divorce in Oklahoma, OKLA. L. REv. 395, 396 (1961).
36. OKLA. STAT. tt. 12, § 1271 (1971).
37. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 488 P.2d 1222 (Okla. 1971); Waller v. Waller, 439 P.2d
952 (Okla. 1968); Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 345 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1959); Chappell v.
Chappell, 298 P.2d 768, 771 (Okla. 1956).
38. 345 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1959).
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spouse was perfectly contented. The most recent guideline appeared
in Kirkland v. Kirkland where the court held that actionable in-
compatibility is determined to exist when there is "such a conflict of
personalities as to destroy the legitimate ends of matrimony and possi-
bility of a reconciliation."3 9 This language is curiously similar to the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, a recent attempt at "no-fault"
divorce described below.
One problem with incompatibility is in distinguishing it from the
other 11 grounds. Adultery is hardly a manifestation of a compatible
relationship. The same rationale would remain true for the other
grounds. Incompatibility would seem to encompass all the grounds
and render them superfluous.
The continued existence of these other grounds serves the func-
tion of perpetuating the fault concept, the punishment-reward sys-
tem of divorce. Oklahoma retains the concept explicitly in section
1278 of title 12, where alimony is taken from the property of the
spouse at fault and awarded to the innocent spouse.40 Other factors
utilized in the determination of alimony include needs of the parties,
ability to earn, duration of the marriage, and conduct as to frugality.4'
These are the factors which should govern the determination. Fault
should not be part of the assessment. The quest for more satisfactory
and beneficial monetary awards through assertion of fault has been the
cause of much, if not most, of the bitterness and acrimony attendant
in divorce proceedings. The inherent difficulties in determining fault
in a divorce militate against such a frequent resort to the concept in
the resolution of divorce cases.
"No-fault" divorce statutes are predicated on a recognition of the
fact that most marriages break down for a number of reasons and be-
cause of an interaction of factors that bears no reasonable relation to
fault. In many cases marital wrongs are not the causes of the break-
down but are merely symptoms of dead marriages which came to an
end because of circumstances for which neither or both spouses were
to blame-differences in education, religion, moral views, financial
views and others. Often the subsequent marital breakdown becomes
manifested in acts of marital misconduct. It is in recognition of these
social facts of married life that "no-fault" divorce statutes are being
enacted in many jurisdictions across the country.
39. 488 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Okla. 1971).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (1971).
41. Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012 (1933).
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Thus far, this article has concentrated on the status of "no-fault"
divorce to date. Assuming a state desires reformation of its divorce
laws, what should it consider in order to realize this desire? The pre-
viously mentioned Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act will serve as a
solid foundation on which to build. The following recommendations
are based in. part on the Uniform Act and in part on the author's
thoughts toward modification of the provisions of the Act.
1. Statement of Purpose-The preamble of such a new act should
contain a clear and definite statement to the effect that "this act is fos-
tered to promote an amicable settlement of disputes and to make the
law of divorce effective in dealing with the realities of matrimonial ex-
perience." This -type of statement leaves little room for confusion of
purpose among those who shall administer the law.4 2
2. Form-The form of the petition should read In re Marriage
of Doe rather than Doe v. Doe. The purpose of this is to alert the
parties that divorce is no longer to be considered an adversary contest.48
3. Grounds/Evidence-Divorce should be available when serious
circumstances have rendered continuation of the marital relationship
impossible. The parties should be permitted to prove this condition
either by concluding a specified period of separation or by demonstrat-
ing the impossibility of reconciliation. Marital fault should have no
bearing on this determination.44
4. Alimony4 -Alimony awards should be based on relevant fac-
tors such as needs of the parties and ability to earn, but in no case
should marital fault be a relevant factor in arriving at a fair award.10
5. Child Custody-The best interests of the child should be the
paramount consideration in determining custody. To this end an attor-
ney should be appointed in every child custody situation to guard these
best interests. The court should not consider conduct of a proposed
custodian that does not affect his relationship with the child.47
6. Conciliation-Counselors should be made available to aid in
the possibility of reconciliation. Counselling should be available on a
voluntary basis, not as a prerequisite to entering divorce hearings.
Conciliation services on a mandatory basis are expensive and of negli-
42. UNIFORM MARRIAcE AND DIVORCE AcT § 102 [hereinafter cited as U.M.D.A.].
43. OKIuA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1273 (1971); U.M.D.A. § 301.
44. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1271 (1971); U.M.D.A. § 302.
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (1971); U.M.D.A. § 308.
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 127 (1971); U.M.D.A. § 307.
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1275, 1277 (1971); U.M.D.A. § 402.
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gible value. By the time parties are seeking a legal solution to their
problem they are usually adamant in their desire to dissolve -the rela-
tion. The effectiveness of conciliation courts and facilities in both Cali-
fornia and Iowa have not demonstrated sufficient effectiveness to war-
rant their inclusion in any other jurisdiction. They seem to serve some
hidden public longing for hope in a situation that is most often, quite
simply, hopeless.
The previous list of recommendations is partial and serves only
to highlight important areas that might cause difficulty in drafting.
Obviously these suggestions are offered to promote an enlightened
approach to the state's role in marital dissolution and not as a panacea
for divorce problems.
Under the present fault concepts, divorce proceedings are quite
often a veritable "parade of horribles." The words "just and equi-
table" in this area have become little more than mere pious cliches.
No-fault divorce takes a progressive step toward replacing the horror
of fault divorce with an atmosphere more conducive to the settlement
of issues collateral -to the termination of the marriage.48  Thoughtful
legislation will carry society a long way down the road to that final goal
of "providing a just, expeditious, and quiet termination of those mar-
riages which society has no legitimate interest in preserving."4 9
48. Sass, supra note 26, at 648.
49. Id. at 649.
19751
9
Steinbock: The Case for No-Fault Divorce
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
